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15 years of ‘War on AIDS’: what impact has the global HIV/AIDS response had on the 
political economy of Africa? 
At the turn of the Millennium multiple leaders across sub-Saharan Africa declared a total war 
against HIV/AIDS.1 For many, such declaration of war against HIV/AIDS was a turning point 
in the political response to the disease on the continent. With the exception of a handful of 
countries such as Uganda, few leaders or governments had taken an active role in publicly 
addressing the spread of the disease in their countries up to this point, with the majority of 
leaders remaining silent over high HIV prevalence rates, and some, perhaps most famously 
Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, denying the relationship between HIV and AIDS (Youde, 2007). 
The declaration of war against the disease at this point was perhaps in part because of wider 
recognition by African governments of the impact of the disease on the death and suffering of 
millions of Africans and the associated consequences for the economies and societies of sub-
Saharan Africa. For some it was also a consequence of the United Nations Security Council 
declaring HIV/AIDS as a threat to peace and security in Africa (UNSC Resolution 1308) that 
made it an exceptional health issue (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 122-3). However, it was also in 
part due to the increase in international attention and finance pledged towards combating 
HIV/AIDS. In 2000 ‘Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases’ became MDG6 of the 
eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN 2000). The World Bank 
launched its Multi-Country AIDS Program; one of the first projects of its kind to require the 
formation of new government agencies to address the epidemic and for governments to commit 
40% of the project to civil society organisations (World Bank 2007). In 2002 the international 
community came together to set up the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Global Fund), a finance mechanism that was designed specifically to raise and disperse funds to 
support governments around the world, but particularly in Africa in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. Multiple international, regional and local non-governmental and faith-based 
organisations mobilised to work with government and international institutions to assist with 
HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support of people living with the HIV/AIDS. Bilateral 
government aid commitments towards the disease grew, most notably with US President George 
W Bush pledging US$15 billion in 2003 in support of his President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR). The result of which was a groundswell of activity towards combating 




The last fifteen years were in many respects ‘the good times’ for HIV/AIDS in terms of the 
finance earmarked towards combating the disease and its elevation to high-level policy status 
both within African and international public policy arenas. However, as finance towards 
HIV/AIDS has now begun to decline and the international community shifts its focus towards 
the sustainable development goals and emergency health crises such as pandemic flu and Ebola, 
it is important to question not only the impact the fifteen year total war on HIV/AIDS has had 
on containing the spread and impact of the disease, but also the lasting impact it has had on the 
political economy of Africa. The purpose of this debate article is to reflect on this wider 
question. The article does so by first reviewing the positive narrative that has been built around 
the global HIV/AIDS response to suggest that the last fifteen years have been a success both in 
the achievements gained in efforts to contain and reduce the spread of the disease, and how 
multiple actors have mobilised and worked together to do so. The article then suggests such 
gains have been over-stated. Second, the article reflects on the wider impact of the global 
response on the political economy of Africa by looking at the impact of the war against 
HIV/AIDS on the health sector and wider governance structures of the state. The article 
concludes by arguing the war on HIV/AIDS has been notable in the funding and actors 
mobilised, the gains in treatment, and the normalisation of the disease in parts of Africa. 
However, such progress has also had external consequences for health sectors and the state 
across sub-Saharan Africa marked by the embedding of market practices of health delivery and a 
hollowing out of many African health sectors. The positive narrative associated with the 
HIV/AIDS response ignores the negative externalities of disease-specific interventions on the 
wider health system and the intrusive reform of the African state. While there have been some 
positive gains in the war on HIV/AIDS, such gains are undermined by questions over the 
longevity and sustainability of the response that have significant consequences for how African 
states organise future health systems and respond to health crises.  
 
The Positive Progress Narrative and Evoking HIV/AIDS 
The common narrative on the global response to HIV/AIDS is one of progress and positivity. 
Such progress is shown in two main ways: results and governance. The progress narrative 
associated with the response to HIV/AIDS in Africa is commonly associated with the results 
and gains in access to treatment and new infection rates. The Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) releases an annual report on the global HIV/AIDS response to 
coincide with World AIDS Day on the 1st December that acts as a progress report on the 
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epidemic, a source of data, and an advocacy tool for what will shape the HIV/AIDS agenda in 
the coming year. These reports are launched with press releases stressing the gains and results 
achieved in the fight against the disease, often citing a growth in numbers of people living with 
HIV/AIDS accessing care and treatment, while raising notes of caution with regard to 
complacency over such progress. The over-arching message is that the global response to 
HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa, has generated positive change in combating the disease, but 
more of the same is needed to continue such progress.  
 
The positivity surrounding such flagship reports is perhaps unsurprising: global institutions have 
to demonstrate to member states, partner states and the wider public that their activities and 
initiatives are working as a means of eliciting support and money; and the data monitoring global 
progress on HIV/AIDS does show some good global outcomes. New infections have declined 
by 50% between 2001 and 2012; 15 million people living with HIV/AIDS are now accessing 
treatment, 9.7 million of which live in low and middle income countries (UNAIDS 2013). 
However, whilst new infection rates in many African countries has declined, as of December 
2012, only 7.6 million people living with HIV/AIDS in Africa were accessing treatment out of 
the 21.2 million deemed eligible (UNAIDS 2013b). It remains the case that 71% of people living 
with HIV/AIDS live in Africa (WHO 2014). Hence, while there has been some progress with 
regard to provision and uptake of treatment and a decline in new infection rates, particularly 
when looking at the global pandemic, progress in Africa has not been so great, with treatment 
still failing to reach over 50% of people living with HIV/AIDS. This is particularly disconcerting 
when considering that the majority of funds towards HIV/AIDS efforts go to treatment 
initiatives and treatment is increasingly cited as a means of prevention (UNAIDS 2012).  
 
Measurable progress and results is a minor part of the progress and positive narrative; most of 
the positivity around the war on HIV/AIDS is associated with rhetoric of how a global 
HIV/AIDS community raised the profile of the disease and positioned it as a global emergency 
in need of a global response. This narrative is commonly asserted by UN agencies such as 
UNAIDS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), non-governmental 
organisations, and leading individuals involved in global health and HIV/AIDS such as Peter 
Piot. HIV/AIDS is often evoked at times of global health crisis: for example the spread of Ebola 
in West Africa has been commonly compared to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa as a means 
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of provoking international condemnation and the need for action (see for example US Secretary 
of State John Kerry in Watt et al, 2014); when needing more effort in combating Ebola, the type 
of effort required is again likened to that seen in the global HIV/AIDS response. HIV/AIDS is 
evoked both as an example of how the global community can take action against a global, or 
increasingly African health crisis, and as a model of global governance to be replicated when 
addressing other concerns such as noncommunicable diseases on the continent. The supposedly 
multi-sectoral, multi-level way in which the global response to HIV/AIDS was organised -  with 
civil society actors and people living with HIV/AIDS sitting on the Executive Board of 
institutions such as the Global Fund, money earmarked for community responses, celebrity-
endorsed high profile advocacy campaigns against stigma or prevention of mother to child 
transmission, the Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa, cross-sector working in 
government and Presidential leadership – is often evoked as an effective model of global health 
governance (see for example Sidibe and Buse, 2013). Increasingly it is not the actual progress 
against HIV/AIDS that is presented as the positive narrative, but the efforts or governance of 
HIV/AIDS that becomes the main part of the positive progress story.  
 
However there is much to suggest that such a positive narrative and the evocation of HIV/AIDS 
as a means of eliciting wider action towards a health issue overlooks several limitations 
associated with the global response. Global advocacy campaigns did make the international 
community and African leaders take action on HIV/AIDS. Most people living in sub-Saharan 
Africa are aware of HIV/AIDS. New institutions were created at the global level and in Africa. 
However treatment remains costly, people continue to become infected with HIV, stigma of 
people living with HIV/AIDS persists, and funding towards HIV/AIDS is now declining. In 
addition, the governance of HIV/AIDS has not been marked by collaboration and consensus 
but competition among international institutions, co-optation of key civil society organisations, 
and the creation of local HIV/AIDS markets where civil society organisations compete for 
resources (Harman 2010). Despite research highlighting the shortcomings of the recent global 
war on HIV/AIDS (see for example Seckinelgin 2010; Johnston 2013; Harman 2010) the need 
to develop a positive narrative around its governance is sustained as a means of justifying further 
investment and attention from the international community. The positive, progressive narrative 
associated with the global HIV/AIDS response is misleading and evoking HIV/AIDS is not the 
solution to the wider health problems of sub-Saharan Africa. As the section below demonstrates, 
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this is particularly the case when considering the impact of the global war on HIV/AIDS on the 
political economy of African health systems and the African state. 
 
HIV/AIDS and the health sector 
The war on HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa has had three notable impacts on the political 
economy of the health sector in the sub-continent: it has skewed health policy and planning 
around HIV/AIDS, particularly in aid-dependent countries; it has introduced a new layer of 
international consultants and accountants to the management of health programmes; and it has 
led to a preoccupation of vertical, disease-based interventions to the detriment of wider health 
system strengthening. Combined, such processes have embedded the use of the market as the 
guiding principle on which health policy is decided upon and created a new non-health specialist 
management-accountancy class within the health sector. The introduction of the market to 
health sector policy and planning in sub-Saharan Africa is not new and can be traced to the 
flawed structural reforms of the health sector in the 1980s. However, as shall be discussed below, 
the finance and models on which HIV/AIDS projects were based since 2000 have accelerated 
this process. 
 
Financing for HIV/AIDS through international aid programmes has ‘flat-lined’ to an average of 
US$7.6-7.8 billion (Kates et al 2013); 47% of which goes to HIV/AIDS programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa. The majority of this money comes not from multilateral financing mechanisms 
such as the Global Fund, but from the US government’s PEPFAR project. In addition to aid 
assistance, African governments such as Kenya, Togo, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Chad and Guinea 
have increased domestic spending towards HIV/AIDS (AVERT, 2014). South Africa tends to 
be the exception to the majority of African countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence 
in that it funds most of its own response with domestic funds and is thus less aid dependent 
(AVERT, 2014). Measurement of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) is fraught with 
complication, however as a general measure as of 2010, it can be said to be around US$28 billion 
(Ottersen et al, 2014), the majority of which is allocated to low and middle income countries. 
Data on DAH includes development assistance to HIV/AIDS projects, hence HIV/AIDS 





The scale of such financing towards HIV/AIDS has a notable impact on the political economy 
of health sector planning and financing, particularly in aid dependent low and middle income 
African countries. The amount of money towards HIV/AIDS and the high-level political status 
afforded to it has created distortions in African health sectors (Biesma et al, 2009), where policy 
and planning is organised around HIV/AIDS rather than the wider needs and concerns of a 
specific country’s health sector. Money earmarked for HIV/AIDS does not go into a wider 
spending pot for public health spending by African state systems but comes with specific 
conditionalities or targets and performance criteria. For example, in the majority of aid-
dependent African countries with high prevalence rates, multilateral funding for HIV/AIDS is 
agreed upon and disbursed through the Ministry of Finance and stand-alone National AIDS 
Councils or co-ordinating functions such as the Global Fund’ Country Co-ordinating 
Mechanisms. Some bilateral funding for HIV/AIDS may be channelled through the Ministry of 
Health but this tends to be the exception than the rule (Harman, 2010). The last fifteen years 
have been marked by a rise in vertical health spending, where development assistance is allocated 
to specific diseases (predominantly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, maternal and new-born 
child health) rather than horizontal efforts such as health system strengthening. This has several 
important consequences. As HIV/AIDS receives more international assistance than any other 
health issue in Africa, it dominates health sector targets. Such financial commitment generates 
significant political will towards proving the impact of such finance in reversing the trend of the 
epidemic. Thus significant parts of the health sector – health ministries, local government 
authorities, Presidential officers, health practitioners – are specifically organised around fulfilling 
international criteria attached to aid and reaching MDG6 above other health concerns that may 
be important to a specific country but lack the finance to back initiatives or the political exposure 
to make them a worthwhile endeavour. Hence the first consequence is distortion in the planning 
and priorities of African health sectors around HIV/AIDS to the detriment of other health 
concerns (see for example Biesma et al 2009 and Pfeiffer et al 2010). This is particularly pertinent 
to the under-investment in health systems across the continent.  
 
The second consequence is that finance earmarked to HIV/AIDS has given rise to specialist 
units and care and treatment centres to the neglect of more general health services in Africa. For 
example, the last fifteen years have seen a growth of new care and treatment centres and 
maternity and new-born child units at the regional and district level in many African countries. 
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Whilst welcome, the introduction of these units have not occurred at the same time as an 
increase in regional and district health centres that address a range of other health concerns that 
affect the health of the African population.  
The third consequence is that in recognition of such trends, health authorities align wider health 
objectives to HIV/AIDS targets rather than HIV/AIDS targets to health objectives (see for 
example Barnes et al, 2015). Understanding that over the last ten years one of the only ways to 
get financing is to align a health issue (or even educational, gender, labour or agricultural issues 
for that matter) to HIV/AIDS as a means of diverting sources to where you want them to go 
there has led to a rise of HIV/AIDS add-ons such as Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon (AIDS + 
Cervical and Breast Cancer) Campaign, or HIV/AIDS and neglected tropical disease. 
HIV/AIDS thus affects the political economy of the health sector with regard to how 
HIV/AIDS finance organises the way in which African health authorities have developed health 
policy and planning so that health policy is oriented around the disease and where the money is 
rather than the wider needs of the health service or a particular country’s population where 
HIV/AIDS is one among many health concerns. 
 
It is not only the amount of money towards HIV/AIDS that has had a distorting impact on the 
political economy of African health systems, but it is how disbursal of the funds have been 
organised. Contemporary financing mechanisms for HIV/AIDS do not include the 
conditionalities of old, but instead refer to performance targets, indicators and results. Targets 
are mostly associated with the MDGs and measures of how progress in reaching these targets is 
linked to indicators such as uptake of antiretroviral treatment, or the number of people 
undergoing voluntary counselling and testing. The performance or results element comes in 
when key targets are met and actors are thus seen to be performing. The introduction of such 
targets and indicators has been a significant part of how both the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
disburse funds. The purpose of targets and indicators is to show measurable results and progress 
in the war on HIV/AIDS, to show that development assistance money works, and to provide 
transparency and accountability over how aid money is spent. For some the introduction of 
performance targets and indicators has been a welcome development in the health sector 
(Eichler, 2006). However the introduction of such targets and indicators has created confusion 
and an additional layer of bureaucracy with regard to how such indicators are managed and 
adjudicated. Different donors have different indicators and targets that are sometimes drawn 
from a country’s Health Management Information System (HMIS) set of indicators and targets 
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for the health sector but often are not or include additional indicators. This leads to overlap and 
the health authorities having to manage competing sets of indicators depending on the donor 
(Barnes et al 2015).  
 
One of the most striking trends of the war on HIV/AIDS in Africa is that it has been a war 
administered by global accountancy firms. Finance for HIV/AIDS in Africa from the Global 
Fund is not managed by the government but principally the accountancy firm 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.2 PriceWaterhouseCoopers acts as the local fund agent for the Global 
Fund, which means it is responsible for overseeing the institution’s operations in Africa, 
verifying performance by the recipients of Global Fund money, and acting as the Fund’s in-
country representative. As local fund agent, such accountancy firms participate in government 
and donor partnership meetings and policy planning processes. Notably they act as an 
interlocutor between government health authorities and donors (Barnes et al, 2015). The role 
and presence of such accountancy firms has specific repercussions for the political economy of 
the health sector. The priorities of the health sector around HIV/AIDS becomes that which can 
be measured and that which demonstrates the best performance according to accountancy 
models of performance rather than public health models of performance. Here the emphasis is 
not on how public health can be delivered to all regardless of quantity of people reached or cost, 
but how health interventions can demonstrate a return on investment either by scale of the 
intervention or its ability to produce a result on a spreadsheet. Combined the use of performance 
targets and indicators and accountants to adjudicate on what constitutes performance introduces 
new economic actors into the health sector in Africa and embeds new public management 
models of performance and return in investment. These changes in the health sector introduced 
as part of the wider machinery of the war on HIV/AIDS in Africa are an extension of the 
market-based approach to health that emphasises return on financial aid investment and rewards 
measurable impact to the detriment of that which cannot be measured.  
 
HIV/AIDS and the African state 
The impact of HIV/AIDS interventions on the political economy of the health sector has wider 
ramifications for those states in Africa with high incidence rates. The war on HIV/AIDS 
introduced new agencies and processes at the national and local level of government and 
embedded multi-sectoral working at the highest level of office. New agencies such as National 
9 
 
AIDS Councils and decentralised district and community AIDS councils became the institutional 
core of national HIV/AIDS strategies and responses in Africa over the last fifteen years. In a 
few cases such as Uganda, these councils predated the MDGs and the scaled up global war on 
HIV/AIDS of the new millennium; however most councils became reinvigorated or introduced 
across sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the World Bank’s Multi-country AIDS Program that 
partly funded the establishment, salaries and institutional support of these agencies. The Global 
Fund contributed to such agencies by housing its country co-ordinating mechanisms (CCMs) in 
the national HIV/AIDS councils in countries such as Tanzania. HIV/AIDS councils operate 
outside of the Ministry of Health and tend to fall under the umbrella of the Office of the 
President or Prime Minister. The establishment of these bodies has clear implications for the 
African state. The most apparent is the fragmentation of the health sector in African states 
where specific health issues such as HIV/AIDS, and now increasingly maternal and newborn 
child health, become removed from the health sector as a means of affording such issues special 
political status. Removing an issue from the health sector to the Office of the President or Prime 
Minister can be interpreted as both a statement of political will and a suggestion that the health 
sector is somehow failing or inadequate. The result of which is a divide between the health sector 
and HIV/AIDS programmes, an embedding of health silos across the machinery of government, 
and the exacerbation of competition and mistrust across ministerial portfolios and between civil 
servants between health ministries, HIV/AIDS councils, and the finance ministries that manage 
international aid. Such practices embed preconceived notions of big man leadership on the 
continent; where issues are only addressed or afforded political will when they are elevated to the 
Office of the President or Prime Minister. The elevation of HIV/AIDS from the health sector to 
the office of the president or prime minister was often not led by the leaders themselves but by 
the donors that established the national AIDS councils as part of their funding criteria (Harman 
2009; Harman 2010).  
 
The establishment of new agencies to take the lead in the war on HIV/AIDS and the 
accompaniment of certain standards has wider impacts on the processes of the state and 
government practice. A clear example of this is the criteria that civil society actors are brought in 
to multiple levels of the state in responding to HIV/AIDS. Such criteria are justified by the 
notion that HIV/AIDS is an exceptional health issue (Lisk 2010) requiring a multi-sectoral 
response. On the one hand such criteria of international funding are an acknowledgment of the 
significant role civil society actors have had on the global response to the epidemic. On the other 
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hand, such requirements can be used as tools to make the government more open and plural to 
non-state-based activities. Such interventions are not just about changing how states approach 
the issue of HIV/AIDS but are changing state practices as to how policy is made and 
implemented by opening government processes up to non-state actor participation and 
influence. In this sense, HIV/AIDS interventions are as much about reforming state processes 
and participation in government structures to be more pluralist as it is about creating a national 
response to HIV/AIDS (Harman 2009; Harman 2010). In responding to HIV/AIDS, 
international donors such as the World Bank and Global Fund have created models for states to 
replicate that require a restructuring of how the African state works to be inclusive and open to 
non-state actors and influences. Such models have created a market in which civil society 
organisations compete for government and donor contracts and positions in decision-making 
structures. For some authors such as Seckinelgin (2008) the global war of HIV/AIDS has led to 
an institutionalisation of the agency of non-governmental organisations which presents a 
disjuncture between the presumed roles of such actors – e.g. feeding in to the policy arena, 
delivering on international policy preferences –and what they do in practice. HIV/AIDS has 
provided justification for international programmes that engage in wider processes of state-
society and government reform in Africa. Such reforms would not be so easily countenanced 
under a programme of good governance, but are somehow permissible or overlooked because of 
the specialist status afforded to the disease by both international donors that are keen to 
promote good governance and the international non-governmental organisations and state 
agencies that normally decry such practices.  
 
Conclusion   
The war against HIV/AIDS launched by civil society, international institutions and  key states at 
the start of the millennium has claimed some victories in Africa. More people living with the 
disease in the continent have access to anti-retroviral treatment, people are aware of AIDS and 
how to prevent HIV transmission, and government leaders from across the continent have taken 
an active and public role in acknowledging the scale of HIV/AIDS and the need to take efforts 
to address it. The response to the epidemic has led to an increase in the number of actors at the 
global, regional, national and local levels from the public, private, health and non-health sectors 
dedicated to responding to the disease. The result of which is for many to claim that the war 
waged on HIV/AIDS is a successful example of how the global community and African 
societies can come together to tackle health problems and turn a health crisis into a manageable, 
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chronic disease. However this article has argued that such a positive progressive framing of the 
war on HIV/AIDS overlooks the wider impact the global response has had on the health sector 
and state in African countries.  
 
The war on HIV/AIDS has led to health sectors being organised around HIV/AIDS, an 
obsession with performance measurement and results to the detriment of wider public health 
concerns and investment in health systems, and the introduction of new models of management 
that have dispersed the authority of the health sector. HIV/AIDS has fundamentally altered the 
political economy of health in Africa in three key ways. First it has expanded the role of the 
market in the delivery of health indicators and results. It has established a market in the health 
sector made up of donor and government contracts to be competed for and won by a range of 
public sector actors - the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the 
President/Prime Minister – and private sector actors drawn from civil society, management 
consultancies, and accountancy firms. This has removed health concerns, policy and delivery 
away from central planning within the health sector and generated a system of health planning 
that is dependent on international targets. Second, the health sector in Africa has been hollowed 
out. This has occurred through the plurality of actors associated with the HIV/AIDS market and 
through the introduction of new institutions and models for governing health concerns by 
international donors that are created outside of the health sector. The establishment of these 
institutions gives rise to the assumption that African health ministries cannot manage health 
emergencies such as HIV/AIDS and that for a health issue to be afforded high-level political 
status it has to be linked to the highest office of government and managed by accountants. Such 
assumptions are reinforcing: the more health ministries are seen as unable to act, the less they are 
financed, the more their mandate is dispersed and thus compromised. Finally, the market for 
HIV/AIDS has been donor-led and in most countries donor-dependent. The gains made in 
uptake of anti-retroviral treatment, with few exceptions, are principally because of the US 
government’s PEPFAR project. Hence the longevity of progress and the ability of African states 
to fit the bill of such treatment programmes when international donors inevitably withdraw will 
yet again make HIV/AIDS a contemporary political hazard for African governments and 
societies.  
The consequence of these factors is that after fifteen years of war against the disease, 
HIV/AIDS has changed how the health sector works in Africa but not necessarily for the good, 
and those gains that have been achieved could be easily reversed. This will have significant 
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implications for the African state in delivering health and treatment, care and support for people 
living with HIV/AIDS. A decline in international assistance for HIV/AIDS may present an 
opportunity for African states to think about how they want to fund and organise their health 
systems. This would be a welcome opportunity to reflect and learn the lessons from past vertical 
financing strategies, see what worked in HIV/AIDS funding, what the challenges were, and how 
this can be used for health system investment. However this scenario takes little account of the 
influence of international donors, non-governmental organisations, accountancy firms, and 
health policy experts and their accompanied finance that often sway the priorities of African 
health policy and practice. The challenge of the African state in financing HIV/AIDS care and 
treatment will be to manage the expectations and interests of international actors, and identify 
new sources of income to finance both HIV/AIDS interventions and the wider health sector 
infrastructure. Alternative sources of income could be derived from new types of donor such as 
the African Development Bank, or would require the state to think about sources of state 
revenue involving new forms (or reform of old forms) of taxation, particularly of the growing 
middle class. However these alternatives come with their own set of problems: new donors 
follow old forms of conditional-based lending, and new forms of taxation require upfront costs 
for the state, and a need to show delivery for what the rising middle class are paying for. The 
legacy of HIV/AIDS financing on the African state and the decline in international 
commitments present both an internal challenge to the African state in regard to how it delivers 
health to its citizens and who pays for it and an external challenge as to how the state manages its 
relationship with a growing number of public and private international actors interested in 
health. Given these challenges, the battle to reverse the disease in Africa is beginning all over 
again for Africans. 
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